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Abstract  
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning have 
gained renewed attention in the past decade, 
particularly in the fields of social judgment, 
learning, and decision-making under uncertainty. 
Although the various accounts differ, the 
common thread is the distinction between two 
qualitatively different types of reasoning: 
explicit/implicit, rational/affective, fast/slow, etc. 
Consequently, much research has focused on 
characterizing the two different processes. Less 
extensive are the attempts to find mediators that 
influence which process is used. In this paper, we 
argue that the missing perspective on these dual-
processing theories is rooted in dynamical 
systems theory. By shifting the perspective to the 
dynamic interaction and transitions between 
different types of reasoning, we provide a 
theoretical framework for dual-processing with 
an emphasis on phase transitions. As a special 
case, we focus on dual-processing in decision-
making and judgment under uncertainty for 
which we will propose suggestions for future 
experimental evaluation. 
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Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning 
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning go back 
to one of the oldest ideas in psychology, namely, 
that the human mind is not driven by a single, 
unified process but by two. Exemplars of such 
ideas include Plato, Hermann von Helmholtz, 
William James, and Sigmund Freud (Frankish & 
Evans, 2009).  
The history of psychological frameworks for 
conceptualizing capacities of the mind—
especially in terms of decision-making and 
reasoning—culminated in the 1970s with dual-
process theories. Dual-process theories have 
taken on various forms (e.g., see Evans, 2008 for 
a review). Nevertheless, there are some common 
features. First, these theories tend to explain the 
working of the human mind in terms of two 
qualitatively distinct cognitive systems, and are 
referred to as type 1/type 2 (Goodwin & Wason, 
1972), System 1/System 2 (Stanovich, 1999), or 
intuitive/deliberative (Kahneman, 2003). 
Moreover, these two kinds of cognitive systems 
tend to be differentiated along the following 
dichotomies: unconscious/conscious, fast/slow, 
automatic/controlled, emotional/rational, 
intuitive/rule-based, etc. There have been, and 
continues to be, broad applications of these 
dualistic frameworks. These include, but are not 
limited to, social judgment (Doherty & Kurtz, 
1996), stereotyping (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & 
Sherman, 1999; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000), learning and problem-solving (Sun, 
Slusarz, & Terry, 2005), creative thinking (Allen 
& Thomas, 2011), and perhaps most famously, 
decision-making and judgment under uncertainty, 
which we will discuss below as a special case. 
The aforementioned phenomena have been 
investigated and explained in terms of two 
distinct cognitive systems or processes. However, 
although they are all “dual-process” theories, 
many of the models utilize slightly different 
characterizations of what is being “dual-
processed.” For the purposes of the current work, 
we will utilize “dual-processing” as referring to 
System 1, which is fast-working, implicit, and 
affect-related, and System 2, which is slow-
working, explicit, and, analytic.  
 
Criticism  
Dual-processing theories of reasoning are not 
without opposition (for a recent discussion, see 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Here we highlight 
three points of criticism we think are most 
prominent and crosscutting. We refer to these as 
conceptual vagueness, evidence, and transition.  
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge 
facing dual-process theories is a lack of 
conceptual clarity. As noted above, although for 
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current purposes we refer to dual-processing 
phenomena in terms of System 1 and System 2, 
there are a number of other labels that are readily 
used, e.g., Type 1 and Type 2, or intuitive vs. 
deliberate processing. In addition, although the 
features that fall under each category can be 
delineated (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Frankish & Evans, 2009), it is unclear whether 
the literature is consistent in the use of such 
categorizations and if the features are agreed 
upon. For example, the term unconscious is 
readily used as a feature describing System 1, 
and conscious as a feature describing System 2. 
Though, what does conscious and unconscious 
even mean? Theoretical terms that refer to the 
domain of the “mental” are particularly burdened 
with the need to be conceptually clear precisely 
because they are inaccessible directly to third 
person, objective scientific practice. The lack of 
such clearly defined and operationalized terms is 
a particular weakness of dual-process theories 
that rely on one process being slow and 
conscious, whereas the other is fast and 
unconscious. 
Another critique of dual-process theories 
stems from a lack of sufficient empirical 
evidence. This point is interweaved with the 
previous critique stemming from conceptual 
vagueness. It is difficult to have evidence for 
something if it is unclear what that something is. 
If we do not know what it is to be conscious or 
unconscious, it is tough to say that data is 
evidence of it. Along these lines, without clear 
conceptual distinctions between System 1 and 
System 2 features, the question will remain 
whether there is sufficient empirical evidence to 
support the strong dichotomy (e.g., Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004). 
The final critique is the unwarranted strong 
focus on static rather than dynamic properties of 
reasoning. Scarcely any attention has been 
directed to the transition from one form of 
processing to another. The current understanding 
of factors that influence dual-processing strictly 
focus on static and binary relationships such that 
the factors necessary to cause one system to 
activate do not cause the other system to activate. 
For example, meta-cognitive difficulty has been 
found to activate System 2 (Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley, & Eyre, 2007), but it is unknown how or 
exactly when the activation occurs. 
Note that it is not our aim to merely reiterate 
the existing criticisms to dual-processing models. 
Our starting point is the phenomenon. For 
example, the difference between calculating two 
plus two and 17 times 24 is that for most of us, 
the latter likely involves a combination of mental 
gymnastics, finger counting, and putting pen to 
paper whereas the answer to the first 
immediately comes to mind (cf. Winerman, 
2012). Consequently, instead of discussing 
questions about the validity of dual-processing as 
a model for cognitive performance, we propose 
an entirely different take. We propose treating 
the transition between different types of 
cognitive processes in terms of nonlinear 
dynamic change, which, as we will show, makes 
the discussion about the strict dichotomy of dual-
processes theories obsolete. 
Our Proposal: A Nonlinear Dynamical 
Systems Theoretical Approach to 
Dual-Processing 
Although there are several theoretical and 
methodological challenges facing dual-process 
theories of reasoning, there have been strides 
made towards more nuanced and sophisticated 
accounts. Evans and Stanovich (2013) put 
forward a theoretical approach to dual-
processing in terms of default responses that can 
be intervened upon by higher-order reasoning 
processes. This account provides a potential 
response to the transition critique discussed 
above and avoids the pitfalls associated with 
models that place features of cognitive 
processing necessarily within a framework of 
binary categories. Instead, there are types of 
processing that share System 1 or System 2 
characteristics. Cognitive processing can occur 
in both kinds of properties—for example, 
conscious and unconscious—such that it is not 
the binary nature of properties that distinguish 
the kinds of thinking so much as the processes 
underlying the thinking that differentiates them.  
Additionally, Wastell (2014) has attempted to 
address the issue of conceptual vagueness by 
appealing to the concepts of complexity theory, 
particularly the notion of emergence. Wastell’s is 
a theory of human reasoning that tries to bring 
together emergence and modularity theory. He 
asserts that reasoning, “is a product of our 
interaction with the environment and our innate 
ability to create, store, and utilize virtual 
reasoning modules” that “emerge” from module-
environment information fit (2014, p. 354-355). 
As Evans and Stanovich prudently note, there 
is a lot of work still to be done, as the 
development of dual-process theories—not to 
mention human reasoning in general—is an 
evolving project that is likely to continue to 
develop (2013). In the spirit of contributing to 
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this evolving project, we present a nonlinear 
dynamical systems theory perspective on 
qualitative transitions in human reasoning, with 
emphasis on the case of decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Theory 
A system can be thought of as a set of parts that 
have relationships to one another, especially 
when the integrated elements accomplish a 
shared or defined task (Norman & Kuras, 2006). 
Almost all systems are dynamic, i.e., their 
behavior changes over time. Dynamical systems 
theory refers to the mathematical understanding 
of change and stability in dynamic systems. 
Dynamical systems theory provides the tools to 
describe, model, and evaluate interactions and 
transitions between qualitatively different 
behaviors without demanding the definition of 
qualitatively different systems. Dynamic systems 
behaviour can be nonlinear, i.e., the output is 
disproportionally related to the input due to 
multiplicative interactions between its 
components (Carello & Moreno, 2005; van Rooij, 
Nash, Rajaraman, & Holden, 2013). This can 
result in sudden unexpected qualitative 
transitions from one stable behavior to the next. 
These kinds of transitions are particularly 
relevant for a different understanding of dual-
processing phenomena in reasoning. 
To illustrate how nonlinear dynamical systems 
theory can shed new light on dual-processing 
phenomena in reasoning, let us take a look at the 
transition of ice to liquid water. At certain 
critical values of pressure and temperature (e.g., 
0° Celsius at sea-level), the tiniest change in 
either can cause the ice to rapidly become liquid 
whereas at other values a much larger change 
may not result. This change between two 
qualitatively different states of water is called a 
phase transition. Phase transitions can be 
anticipated or accompanied by universal 
dynamical patterns, so-called catastrophe flags 
(Gilmore, 1993; Isnard & Zeeman, 1976; Thom, 
1972). For example, although common 
understanding is that the transition of liquid back 
into ice occurs at 0° Celsius, in reality water does 
not freeze until it is -4° Celsius. This means that 
between 0° and -4° Celsius, water is multistable, 
and the transition of ice into water—and vice 
versa—does not necessarily occur at the same 
temperature value. Moreover, a so-called 
hysteresis effect is observed: After ice turns into 
water due to increasing temperature, a 
significantly larger decrease in temperature is 
needed to re-establish the previous solid state.  
Sudden change, multistability, and hysteresis 
are three of the eight known catastrophe flags 
(Gilmore, 1981). All eight catastrophe flags are 
behavioral properties of nonlinear dynamical 
systems at the level of their dynamics, although 
some (e.g., hysteresis and multistability) can also 
be observed at the level of the system behavior 
itself. Observing catastrophe flags around 
qualitative change is a strong indicator that the 
system of interest is a nonlinear dynamical 
system, and that the observed change is 
indicative of a phase transition. Catastrophe flags 
have been observed in relation to a broad range 
of human behavioral changes. The most 
extensive and successful applications of 
nonlinear dynamical systems theory to human 
behavior are to human development (e.g., Thelen 
& Smith, 1998; van Geert, 1994), movement, 
action, and perception (e.g., Fajen & Warren, 
2003; Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Richardson, 
Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007; 
Warren, 1984). 
Applications to human higher-order cognition 
are less numerous for at least two reasons: First, 
the dominant computational-representational 
paradigm in cognitive science resulted in a 
strong focus on stable states rather than change 
(cf. Stephen & Van Orden, 2012). Second, in 
addition to issues related to localizing cognitive 
functions in the brain (cf. Anderson, 2014), 
defining precise boundaries around cognitive 
systems (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Favela & 
Chemero, 2016) and properly accounting for 
relevant degrees of freedom in cognitive systems 
can be very challenging (cf. Kelso, 1995). There 
have a number of successes though. One 
particular empirically compelling demonstration 
of a higher-order cognitive phase transition is by 
Van Orden and colleagues (1999), who identified 
homophones as a bifurcation phenomenon. 
In the following section, we present a case 
study demonstrating the application of nonlinear 
dynamical systems theory with an emphasis on 
phase transitions to inform a novel approach to 
dual-processing in decision-making. It is 
important to note that the concept of a “phase 
transition” is not merely a metaphor for physical 
change; it refers to real change in a system. A 
phase transition is nature’s mechanism of 
qualitative change. It provides a way to explain 
the existence of qualitatively different behaviors 
within a continuum. 
1675
Case Study: Dual-Processing as Phase 
Transition in Decision-Making and 
Judgment under Uncertainty 
As noted above, that humans have multiple 
decision-making capabilities is an idea that has 
reoccurred over the history of psychological 
theorizing. One commonality among such 
theories (e.g., Plato, Helmholtz, Kahneman, etc.) 
is that these multiple kinds are distinct, modular, 
and cognitively encapsulated processes. Such a 
treatment is faced with serious theoretical and 
methodological challenges stemming from issues 
related to conceptual vagueness and lack of 
empirical evidence. One particular criticism, 
which we think has not received enough 
attention, stems from understanding the 
transitions among these various capabilities. Our 
main claim is that such transitions are best 
understood as phase transitions. 
Suggestions for Experimental Evaluation 
Taking a nonlinear dynamical systems theoretic 
view on dual-processing phenomena in decision-
making under uncertainty means we need to 
study the transitions in cognitive processing 
along the continuum of reasoning from ultra-
quick memory retrieval to slow explicit 
processing. This requires finding the transition 
itself, which includes identifying order and 
control parameters that characterize the 
underlying system. 
Finding the Transition. In a clever series of 
experiments, Alter et al., (2007) devised ways in 
which they could activate their version of 
System 2. For example, they found that 
participants presented with information that was 
difficult to read were less prone to reasoning 
biases typically associated with System 1 and 
concluded that incidental experiences of 
difficulty or “disfluency” activated System 2.  
Unfortunately, in each of the experiments, only 
two conditions were used. The obvious extension 
to this type of work would be to present 
participants with a gradual change in legibility of 
the presented information in order to find the 
actual transition, and see whether this is indeed 
discontinuous (as dual-processing theories 
suggest) or continuous. 
Finding the Order and Control Parameters. 
Order parameters capture macroscopic states of 
a system (Haken, 1988/2006). These order 
parameters determine the behavior of individual 
parts of the system. Order parameters can also be 
thought of as the dependent variable of a system, 
that is, the target of measurement in an 
experiment. Control parameters are variables 
that guide a system’s dynamics. Control 
parameters can also be thought of as independent 
variables of a system. Note however that 
although it can be helpful to think of control 
parameters as independent variables and order 
parameters as dependent variables, it is important 
to keep in mind that the relationship between 
order and control parameters is not exactly the 
same as that of dependent and independent 
variables. The control variable does not cause 
the system’s behavior. This is partially due to a 
“slaving” relationship between order and control 
parameters (Haken, 1988/2006). Although 
control parameters are intertwined with the 
dynamics exhibited by the order parameter, the 
relationship is nonlinear.  
Identifying the order and control parameters 
allows for the development of models that 
capture the full range of a system’s dynamics. In 
the same way that the interaction between 
pressure and temperature results in phase 
transitions of water, we must therefore discover 
variables that lead the cognitive system through 
its possible states in decision-making. Following 
Thelen and Smith (1998), such a task can be 
summed up as follows: First, identify the order 
parameter of interest. Second, characterize the 
qualitatively different behaviours corresponding 
to different values of the order parameter. Third, 
describe the dynamic trajectory of the order 
parameter. Fourth, identify points of transition. 
Finally, identify potential control parameters and 
manipulate putative control parameters to 
experimentally generate transitions. 
Recently, we utilized these steps to 
demonstrate catastrophe flags in the behavioral 
transition between risk-seeking and risk-averse 
strategies in a simple risky choice task (van 
Rooij, Favela, Malone & Richardson, 2013a, 
2013b) and similarly in the preference between 
immediate and delayed rewards (van Rooij & 
Richardson, 2014). The success of these studies 
bolsters the case for taking nonlinear dynamical 
systems theoretic approach to dual-processing. 
Another factor hypothesized to affect decision 
making in terms of dual-processing is cognitive 
load. Cognitive load refers to the demand that 
cognitive activities place on working memory 
(e.g., Miller, 1956). When System 1 is under 
heavy cognitive load, its ability to correct 
System 2 decreases, which can lead to more 
unexpected decision behavior. For example, 
increased cognitive load results in higher than 
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expected levels of risk aversion (Benjamin, 
Brown, & Shapiro, 2013). We hypothesize that 
cognitive load may act as a so-called splitting 
factor, i.e., an order parameter influencing the 
moment of occurrence of the phase transition. 
Discussion & Future Directions 
Attempts to characterize the workings of the 
human mind in terms of two cognitive systems 
or processing, as well as debates about the 
conceptual strength of these characterizations, 
distract from a more fundamental issue: Starting 
with the phenomenological distinction between 
slow/deliberate and fast/intuitive reasoning, it is 
the interactions between these processes as well 
as the dynamic control that should be the focus 
of scientific inquiries into the subject. 
Accordingly, this requires an approach rooted in 
nonlinear dynamical systems theory. 
Nonlinear dynamical systems are also referred 
to as complex systems, and are formed from 
(many) parts such that the behavior of the system 
is irreducible or deducible from the properties of 
the parts (Norman & Kuras, 2006). In other 
words, the behavior of complex systems is 
dominated by the dynamic interactions between 
parts rather than the properties of the parts 
themselves (Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 
2003, 2005). 
Most natural systems are complex in the ways 
just described. A clear example is the human 
brain. Not only is brain activity constantly 
interacting and controlled by behavioral and 
environmental factors (e.g., Van Orden, Hollis, 
& Wallot, 2012), but emerging, global-level 
properties such as consciousness are not easily 
captured in one-to-one relations between single 
neurons or even single areas of the (Anderson, 
2014). A growing body of literature indeed 
places human cognition firmly within a 
framework of nonlinear dynamical systems or 
complex systems theory. We believe dual-
processing theories could also be understood 
within this framework and outlined possibilities 
for experimental evaluation.  
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